An Empirical Study on the Cadre Responsibility System of Local Government in China

Liu Mingxing 1, Hou Linke  2 and Tao Ran
1 China Institute for Educational Finance Research, Peking University, Beijing, China
2Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, China
3 School of Economics, Renmin University of China; Center for Urban Development and Land Policy, the PKU-Lincoln Institute,Beijing, China

 
Abstract: Based on nationally representative panel data, this paper examines the content and evolution of China’s cadre responsibility system at county-township and township village levels. Our findings suggest that, with abolition of agricultural tax, there has been a series of changes in the focus of evaluation both at county-township and township-village levels. In county-township evaluation system, importance of economic development and social stability grew but fiscal pressure did not weaken; while in township-village system, original indicator of fiscal pressure became less important. Meanwhile, by enhancing “veto” indicator of evaluation on village cadres, township government attempted to cascade the pressure of social stability to village administration. Although central government has initiated a series of reforms on agriculture, countryside and farmers, county and township governments did not pay more attention to rural infrastructure. In addition, county government paid less and less attention to farmers’ income growth.
Keywords: abolition of agricultural tax, cadre responsibility system, Priority Targets with Veto Power

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